Comet Enthusiast

From the Augustine report:

"In summary, the Committee considers the EELV-heritage
super-heavy vehicle to be a way to significantly reduce the
operating cost of the heavy lifter to NASA in the long run.
It would be a less-capable vehicle, but probably sufficiently
capable for the mission. Reaping the long-term cost benefits
would require substantial disruption in NASA, and force the
agency to adopt a new way of doing business. The choice
between NASA and EELV heritage is driven by potentially
lower development and operations cost (favoring the
EELV-heritage systems) vs. continuity of NASA’s system
design, development and mission assurance knowledge
and experience, which would provide higher probability of
successful and predictable developments (favoring NASA
systems). EELV-heritage launch systems, due to their lower
payload performance, would require significantly greater
launch and mission complexity to achieve the same total
mass in orbit. The EELV option would also entail substantial
reductions in the NASA workforce and closure of facilities
necessary to obtain the expected cost reductions." pp 93-4.

"In the case of NASA, one result of this dilemma is that
in order to pursue major new programs, existing programs
have had to be terminated, sometimes prematurely. Thus,
the demise of the Space Shuttle and the birth of “the gap.”
Unless recognized and dealt with, this pattern will continue.
When the ISS is eventually retired, will NASA have
the capability to pursue exploration beyond low-Earth orbit,
or will there be still another gap? When a human-rated
heavy-lift vehicle is ready, will lunar systems be available?
This is the fundamental conundrum of the NASA budget.
Continuation of the prevailing program execution practices
(i.e., high fixed cost and high overhead), together with flat
budgets, virtually guarantees the creation of additional new
gaps in the years ahead. Programs need to be planned,
budgeted and executed so that development and operations
can proceed in a phased, somewhat overlapping manner.

An additional action that would help alleviate the gap phenomenon
is to reenergize NASA’s space technology program,
an important effort that has significantly atrophied
over the years. The role of such a program is to develop
advanced components (for example, new liquid rocket engines)
that can later be incorporated into major systems.
Developing components concurrently with, or as a part
of, major system undertakings is a very costly practice. A
technology development program closely coordinated with
major ongoing programs, but conducted independently of
them, is preferable." p 112.

In sum, the committee goes along with the Flexible Path championed by Augustine and Planetary Society, but replaces the cheaper liquid Heavy Lifter with a solid one (first quote).

Tie that in with the development out of phase and the underfunding (second quote) and yes, the committee goes against the Augustine report in a substantial and likely hurtful manner. Hurtful for space that is, NASA, the local contractors and the military contractors (which substantial ties through solid rocket boosters are described elsewhere in the report) remain protected.

To prop that up the shown speech discuss the technical part (it is feasible) instead of the economical (it "virtually guarantees the creation of additional new gaps in the years ahead").

Hopefully the administration can straighten some of this mess up.

In a first analysis it isn't as vital to resize NASA to commercial contractors and technical development as it is to separate out the military contractors. What was once a potential efficiency measure (larger contractor "market") is now hindering efficiency (smaller commercial market).